The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New Hope for the Beleaguered Tenant? by Castaldo, Irene
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 48 
Number 3 Volume 48, March 1974, Number 3 Article 9 
August 2012 
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New Hope for 
the Beleaguered Tenant? 
Irene Castaldo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Castaldo, Irene (1974) "The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New Hope for the Beleaguered 
Tenant?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 48 : No. 3 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss3/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT ACT: NEW HOPE FOR THE
BELEAGUERED TENANT?
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA),
introduced by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws," is a newly formulated code regulating the landlord-tenant
relationship. It attempts to alleviate the major inconsistencies and
inequities of the common law leasing agreement, and "to simplify,
clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing the rental of dwell-
ing units and the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants. 12
At present, Arizona has adopted the Act,3 the Hawaii legislature has
passed an earlier draft,4 and several other states have initiated statu-
tory reforms inspired by principles espoused in the code.5
The URLTA is the outgrowth of a tentative model code de-
veloped, in 1969, by the American Bar Foundation (ABF) under the
sponsorship of the Office of Economic Opportunity.6 The current Act,
like the original ABF code, seeks to regulate residential tenancies not
"incidental to another primary purpose." Although the URLTA
I The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act [hereinafter cited as URLTA]
was approved and recommended for enactment by the Commissioners at their annual con-
ference, Aug. 10, 1972, by a vote of 37 to 2, Virginia and West Virginia dissenting. The
subsequent request for American Bar Association (ABA) approval was, however, later
withdrawn in February of 1973. See Subcommittee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUsT J. 104 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Subcommittee]. At its August, 1973 conference, the Commission decided to give
the Act further consideration before resubmitting it to the ABA.
2 URLTA § 1.102(b)(1).
3 Amiz. REy. STAT. §§ 33-321, -381, -1301 to -1381 (1973).
4 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521 (Supp. 1973).
5 See Tenants Outlook, July, 1973, at 1, 7.
6 See Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems with
Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1970); Levi, New Landlord-
Tenant Legal Relations - The Model Landlord-Tenant Code, 3 URBAN LAWYER 592 (1971);
Pollock & Kokus, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code-Proposed Procedural Re-
forms, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 317 (1971); Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant
Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 550 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Trends]; Note, Model Landlord-Tenant Code, 26 RtrGros L REv. 647 (1973).
7 URLTA § 1.202, Comment at 5-6; see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-101 & Comment (1969) [hereinafter cited as TENTATIVE MODEL
CODE]. Exclusions from the URLTA, unless "created to avoid [its] application," include
residency at medical, geriatric, educational, or religious institutions or incidental to
counseling or other services; occupancy of a unit under contract of sale; occupancy as a
member of a fraternal or social organization in a unit benefitting such group; transient
hotel or motel occupancy; occupancy conditioned upon employment on the premises;
condominium ownership or occupancy under a proprietary lease; occupancy of premises
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treats both sides of the lease agreement, its most potent provisions are
those which create non-waivable tenant rights." Thus, the lessee is
compensated for his classic lack of bargaining power, and protected
from victimization by adhesion contracts.9 Such widesweeping reform
merits critical examination in light of the evolution of the landlord-
tenant relationship both at common law and in the New York Legis-
lature.
BACKGROUND
The lease agreement is part contract and part conveyance. Its
history is characterized by a shifting balance between the two, the
lease originally being viewed as contractual and later primarily as a
conveyance of real property.'0 The common law of landlord and tenant
in this country springs from the conveyance stage of agrarian English
history. 1 This "ancient conveyance ... [is] based on a forgotten prem-
for primarily agricultural purposes. URLTA § 1.202. This section would apparently dis-
allow application of the URLTA to migrant workers and their land owner employers. Id.
§ 1.202(5). The Subcommittee's report criticizes this section for excluding students residing
at institutions, tenants in "company towns," sharecroppers, and tenant farmers. The exclu-
sion of occupancy by a condominium owner from the Act's domain is shown to be super-
fluous and confusing since, in such cases, there is no landlord-tenant relationship. Sub-
committee, supra note 1, at 105-06.
8 URLTA § 403(a)(1).
Rental agreements are often executed on forms provided by landlords, and some
contain adhesion clauses the use of which is prohibited by this section. _
Id. Comment. See note 32 infra.
o See McElhaney, Retaliatory Eviction: Landlord, Tenant and Land Reform, 29 MD.
L REv. 193, 195 (1969). An adhesion contract is one in which there is little or no bargaining
due to one party's superior position. Standard forms, as those generally used for leases,
have become the symbol and tool of the adhesion contract. See notes 31, 32 infra.
10 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 221 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PowELL]; Trends,
supra note 6, at 551. See generally Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective:
From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REv. 369 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Perspective].
Tenancies for terms of years, as compared to tenancies in fee for life, were rare before
the year 1200. They functioned as "beneficial leases" primarily as collateral for loans or
what today would be termed mortgages. 2 F. PoLoca & F. MAITLAND, THE HIsToRY OF
ENGLISH LAw 110-11 (2d ed. 1898). Husbandry leases, a later development, were used as
contracts for labor on the land. POWELL 221. By Henry II's day, the tenant for years or
"termor" had received the benefits of contract although he had no rights in and to the
land itself. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra, at 36; W.S. HoLoswoRTH, HSTORICAL INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LAND LAw 72 (1927) [hereinafter cited as HoLDswoRTH]. A slow transition
between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries resulted in the tenant's acquiring a "fully
protected interest in the land." HOLDswoRTH, supra, at 73. The lease had become recognized
primarily as a conveyance. Its contract aspects were not denied, but were explained away
as "merely. . . the aggregate of the convenants into which the parties may have entered
in connection with the making of the conveyance by way of lease." 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW
OF RFAL PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 1920).
11 6 S. WILLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962); Perspective, supra note 10, at 371;
QUINN & PHILLIPS, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 18 FORDHAm L. REv. 225 (1969).
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ise that a tenant is primarily interested in the use of the land . ... ,12
At common law, responsibility for the condition of the dwelling unit,
for better or for worse, was vested entirely -in the lessee from the time
he took possession. However, with the coming of industry and growth
in urbanization, the concept of a lease being the conveyance of an
estate became unsuitable to the changing needs of the lessee. Unlike
his agrarian predecessor, he was not interested in the land per se, nor
was it feasible for him to initially make his leased dwelling habitable,
keep it that way with major repairs, and provide for the essential
services of heat, water, plumbing and electricity.13 This transition
sparked renewed emphasis on the contractual nature of the lease.' 4
What the modern lessee wants, and too often does not obtain, is more
than a contract for "shelter."' 5 The tenant's need has developed into
one for a "well-known package of goods and services."' 6
Today, the lessee's true desire is to obtain habitable living quar-
ters which will be maintained for him as such. However, confronted
with housing shortages and urban population growth, he discovers that
he is virtually without bargaining power.' 7 Nor can he confidently
rely on basic contract principles since the lease is still heavily tinged
by the "conveyance-property" stage of its development. 18 For example,
in the common law of a majority of the states the duty of an aggrieved
12 Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 165, 166 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman].
13 Perspective, supra note 10, at 373; TENATATIVE MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at 6.
14 POWELL, supra note 10, 221, See generally Friedman, supra note 12; Perspective,
supra note 10, at 372-75; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Schoshinski]; Trends, supra note 6,
at 565-67.
15 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
16 Id. See Schoshinski, supra note 14, at 536-37.
17 The low vacancy rate greatly diminishes tenant mobility. The U.S. Bureau of the
Census reports that the year-round vacancy rate for sound and deteriorating (as opposed






1972 (1st quarter) 1.8%
U.S. STATISlCAL ABSTRACTS No. 1151 at 685 (1972) (Current Housing Reports ser. H-1 11).
18 Thus the background of the lease as a conveyance, built solidly by 1500, has a
tremendous foreground, evolved largely since 1800, which is purely contractual in
character. The modem law is the synthesis of these two historical factors. Some-
times the background peeks through and controls. Sometimes the foreground is
alone considered as determinative. The lawyer's problem is to determine which
of these two factors is to control in his specific controversy.
POWELL, supra note 10, 221.
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party to mitigate damages "has no application to a contract of leasing
as the latter is governed by peculiar and entirely different rules."19
Therefore if a tenant is in breach of the lease agreement, and there has
been no covenant to the contrary, the landlord may bring suit for the
entire amount of the rent without any attempt to relet the premises.
Furthermore, aside from the tenant's duty to pay rent and his right to
quiet enjoyment, the covenants in the common law lease are inde-
pendent.20 Thus, even if the landlord breaches a specific lease cove-
nant, the tenant must continue to pay full rent.
The courts' response to this latter difficulty was to expand the
judicial definition of quiet enjoyment2 ' by creating the fiction of "con-
structive eviction." 22 Reliance on this defense, however, entails high
risks for the lessee who must prove that the "substantial breach"
which makes the premises uninhabitable is the fault of the landlord
or of his agent. He must also vacate the premises immediately to sub-
stantiate his allegations.23 If justified, the tenant receives a total rent
abatement; if adjudicated in the wrong, he is liable on the lease.
The tenant's lease contract does not afford him the safeguards
enjoyed by parties to public or commercial contracts for goods and
services. The reform experienced in the latter group, since widespread
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), has largely by-
19 Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 9 App. Div. 115, 119, 41 N.Y.S. 73, 75 (2d
Dep't 1896), rev'd on other grounds, 162 N.Y. 888, 56 N.E. 903 (1900), cited in Sancourt
Realty Corp. v. Dowling, 220 App. Div. 660, 222 N.Y.S. 288, 289 (Ist Dep't 1927); Fermaglich
v. Warshawiak, 42 Misc. 2d 1077, 1081, 249 N.Y.S.2d 963, 968 (Rockland County Ct. 1964).
Contra, Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945); Lawson v.
Callaway, 131 Kan. 789, 293 P. 503 (1930). The latter minority rule "seems to be the
preferable rule, since it applies to contracts of leasing the business approach applicable
generally to other contracts." PowE.v, supra note 10, at 107 n.97.
20 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Cohen, 132 App. Div. 87, 88, 116 N.Y.S. 510, 511 (2d Dep't
1909) (duty to repair and obligation to pay are independent); 165 West 46th St. Corp. v.
Radio-Keith Orpheum Vaudeville Exch., Inc., 157 Misc. 816, 817, 285 N.Y.S. 373, 375 (City
Ct. New York County 1935) (real estate tax payments and repairs are independent of the
duty to pay rent); Edwards v. Ward Associates, Inc., 367 S.W.2d 390, 393 (rex. Civ. App.
1963) (rent and repairs are independent).
21 Quiet enjoyment had original reference only to the title of the property and not to
its condition. Cleves v. Willoughby, 7 Hill 83, 86 (N.Y. 1845); Rotter v Goerlitz, 16 Daly
484,485,12 N.Y.5. 210 (C.P. New York County 1891).22 In New York, the first case in which a court allowed a plea of constructive eviction
was Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826). Noise and disturbance caused by lewd
women whom the lessor brought into the building forced the tenant to move out. The
court allowed evidence of the "constructive eviction" basing its decision on a comparison
with partial actual eviction. 8 Cow. at 731. See Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenants'
Remedies Act, 7 HARv. J. LEGIs. 357, 359 (1970); Trends, supra note 4, at 552.
23 PolvELL, supra note 10, 225(3); Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp.,
26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 808 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970), rev'g 31 App. Div. 2d 342, 298
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1969); Zweighaft v. Remington, 66 Misc. 2d 261, 820 N.Y.S.2d 151
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971). Contra, East Haven Associates, Inc. v. Gurian, 64 Misc. 2d 276, 313
N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970).
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passed landlord-tenant law. The classic example of this disparity is in
the area of the implied warranty of fitness for use, which may be
likened to "habitability" in lease contracts.2 4 In the past, this warranty
found no general acceptance in property law25 except in the sale of
new homes26 and the lease of furnished apartments. 27 In recent years,
courts have been increasingly prone to find the warranty implicit in
various types of leases.28 There has also been some scattered legislation
to this effect.29 Yet, there is still lacking a definitive statement of the
obligation owed to a tenant by a landlord inherent in a lease agree-
ment.3 0
Freedom of contract, though often touted as integral to the Amer-
ican system of free enterprise and "bargain shopping," 3' is without
meaning for the buyer in a seller's market. The tenant becomes a
party to a contract which he had little part in formulating.3 2 The in-
2 4 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
25 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99 (3d ed. 1939). The common law lease
is governed by the principle of caveat emptor with no implied warranty of tenantability
or fitness for a particular use. See Richard Paul Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp.
252 (D. Del. 1945); Welson v. Neujan Bldg. Corp., 264 N.Y. 303, 190 N.E. 648 (1934);
Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889). See generally Lesar, Landlord and
Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1279 (1960).
2 6 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Waggoner v. Mid-
western Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
27 Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
28 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. Ct. 1968) (housing code violations); Lemle v. Breedon,
51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (rat infestation); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265
A.2d 526 (1970) (faulty plumbing); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d
268 (1969) (flooding).
29 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1929, 1941 (West 1954); MoNr. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 42-
201 (1947); N.D. REV. CODES § 47-16-12 (1952); 41 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 31 (1951); S.D. Comp.
LAWS § 43-32-8 (1967).
In New York the Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL), applicable to cities of 500,000 or
more population, requires the landlord to supply gas or electrical lighting, water, plumb-
ing and drainage, heat, wash room facilities, make repairs, and to keep the premises clean.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 64, 75, 77, 79, 80 (McKinney 1946), as amended (Supp. 1973);
id. § 76 (McKinney Supp. 1973); id. § 78 (McKinney 1946). The Multiple Residence Law
(MRL), which applies to cities of less than 500,000 population and to all towns and
villages, and the New York City Administrative Code have similar provisions. N.Y. MuLT.
RES. LAW §§ 170-71 (McKinney 1952), as amended (Supp. 1973); id. §§ 172-74 (McKinney
1952); N.Y. CITY ADMmN. CODE §§ D26-10.01, -11.03, -15.01, -16.01, -17.01, -19.01 (1970).
Where there are building code violations, the MDL allows the tenant himself to bring
the complaint if the landlord fails to act upon a order to correct them. N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 309 (1) (f) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
30 See generally Prospective, supra note 10; Trends, supra note 6.
31 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Funda-
mental Breach, 50 U. VA. L. REv. 1178, 1181(1964).
32 Note the usage of standard form leases: Gilsey Form Lease A185; Form of Apart-
ment Lease Approved by the Committee on Real Property of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York 48; Apartment Lease A261; Dwelling House Lease A54.
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tent of the URLTA is to protect the'lessee from unconscionable prac-
tices by re-interpreting "freedom of contract" in light of "the social
importance of the type of contract and the degree of monopoly en-
joyed by the author of the standardized contract." 33 What the tenant
lacks in bargaining power and legal sophistication in the handling of
lease forms, the URLTA would compensate by creating inalienable
rights issuing from the status of tenancy.
PROVISIONS OF THE AcT
Validity of the Lease
Among the Act's general provisions is the implied obligation of
good faith dealing34 and the duty of an aggrieved party to mitigate
damages.35 The latter feature serves to minimize the tenant's liability,
particularly in cases of abandonment, since it is likely that a landlord
using "reasonable efforts" will find substitute tenants. More signifi-
canty, however, the URLTA further reflects the UCC's influence by
vitiating oppressive lease agreements and settlements, thus allowing
the courts to separate the wheat from the chaff to avoid "unconscion-
able results."30
This provision is susceptible to the same criticisms directed to-
wards its counterpart in the UCC. Just what is meant by the amor-
phous term "unconscionable"? How may contract makers know in
advance whether they are creating an enforceable agreement?37 If
analogy to the UCO be extended, the answer may lie in the guidelines
developed in interpreting commercial unconscionability. Courts should
33 Kessler, supra note 31, at 642.
34 URLTA § 1.302. This section is applicable to all other sections and intended to be
identical to UCC § 1-203. URLTA § 1.302, Comment.
35 Id. §§ 1.105 (a), 4.203 (c).
36 URLTA § 1.303 derived from UCC § 2-302 is as follows:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds
(1) a rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when
made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of
the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of
any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or
(2) a settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right
under this Act or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the
court may refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settle-
ment without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any un-
conscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own
motion the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid
the court in making the determination.
37 W. D. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACrONAL GumE TO THE U.C.C. § 1.1601 (1964); Elling-
haus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); see Meyer, supra note 29;
Comment, Unconscionability-the Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. a COA.
L. Rxv. 367 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Unconscionability].
1974]
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inquire into whether or not the lease terms were unreasonably one-
sided, whether the parties had a meaningful choice, and whether they
had a "reasonable opportunity to understand the contract." 38 Since no
Act could be so comprehensive as to address all possible loopholes
which might be built into a lease, the provision against unconscion-
ability has the added advantage of proscribing novel as well as pre-
existent abuses.
The assault upon adhesion contracts is further supplemented by
section 1.403(a). This section specifically prohibits waiver of tenant
remedies under the Act, confession of judgment, agreement to pay
landlords' attorneys' fees, and exculpation or indemnification of a
landlord for any legal liability he may have.
There are comparable provisions in New York law. For example,
a lease provision waiving trial by jury is null and void.89 A lease re-
quiring a defaulting tenant to pay the landlord's attorney's fees and/or
expenses impliedly imposes a corresponding duty on the landlord
should the tenant initiate the action.40 Also, agreements exempting a
lessor from liability for negligence are void and unenforceable. 41
URLTA section 1.403(b), providing punitive damages against a
landlord who deliberately includes a prohibited provision in the rental
agreement, has been criticized by the American Bar Association's Sub-
committee of the Committee on Leases.42 The Subcommittee feels it
is unnecessary to add penalties when such provisions would in any case
be unenforceable.43 However, the interest in protecting a tenant de-
ceived, through his ignorance of the law, into compliance with an
unenforceable covenant44 outweighs the abhorrence to penalties in
civil matters. Section 1.403(b)'s suggested forfeiture of three months'
rent by a landlord employing banned provisions serves a valid purpose
in ensuring compliance with this part of the Act. However, since this
38 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50. (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See Unconscionability, supra note 37, at 868.
39 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 259-c (McKinney 1968).
40 Id. § 234 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
41 N.Y. GN. OBLiG. LAW § 5-221 (McKinney 1964). Other provisions of New York law
operate to protect lessees from unconscionable practices, Compare N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-703(2) (McKinney 1964) (a lease for more than one year must be evidenced by a "con-
tract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing consideration') with URLTA §
1.402 (c). See also N.Y. Gmn. OBG. LAw § 5-1103 (McKinney 1964) (a written agreement,
signed by the party against whom it is to be enforced is necessary to modify or discharge
a lease).
42 Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 108.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 108, 109.
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section may conflict with others in the Act, it must be clarified to pro-
tect the landlord from undue hardship in its enforcement.45
Maintenance of Premises by Landlord
The URLTA follows the trend of court decisions finding implied
warranties of habitability in lease agreements46 by imposing duties on a
landlord to maintain and repair leased premises.47 Thus, the Act finally
puts to rest the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to leases48 and
compensates for the tenant's lack of bargaining power by recognizing
"standards of habitability" as a matter of "public police power rather
than the contract of the parties or special landlord-tenant legislation." 49
45 The Subcommittee criticizes this section for its inconsistency with other parts of
the Act.
The consequences of punitive damages may well cause more confusion than the
use of the prohibited language. For example, in certain cases the Act allows the
landlord to collect reasonable attorney's fees [§§ 4.201(c), 4.302(a)]. Inclusions of
the exact language of such sections of the Act in the lease does not appear to be
objectionable, but to do so would violate the prohibition against the tenant agree-
ing in advance to pay landlord's attorney's fees, and thus may not only Tender the
provision unenforceable but also subject the landlord to punitive damages.
46 Javins v. First Nat1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. Ct. 1968); Lemle v. Breedon, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Morbeth Realty
Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Jackson v.
Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d. 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
47 URLTA § 2.104 (a). The section reads:
(a) A landlord shall
(1) comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes
materially affecting health and safety;
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises
in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and
appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;
(5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the
removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy
of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and
(6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times
and reasonable heat between [October 1] and [May 1] except where the building
which contains the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that
purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is gen-
erated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied
by a direct public utility connection.
48 Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
A prospective lessee ... cannot be expected to know [such things as whether] the
plumbing or wiring systems are adecguate or conform to local codes. Nor should
he be expected to hire experts to advise him.
53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272. Contra, Fermaglich v. Warshawiack, 42 Misc. 2d 1077, 249
N.Y.S.2d 963 (Rockland County Ct. 1964).
However, the Act nowhere imposes the initial duty to supply electrical, sewer and
drainage or ventilating facilities, but merely requires the landlord to comply with local
building and housing codes. URLTA § 2.104(a) (1).
49 URLTA § 2.104, Comment. The landlord and tenant in a single family residence
are rightly allowed more latitude in a good faith, written transfer of certain duties to the
1974]
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In New York, the Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL), Multiple Resi-
dence Law (MRL), and the New York City Administrative Code im-
pose a duty to repair upon the landlord,5" while holding the tenant
liable for violations "caused by his own wilful act, assistance or negli-
gence or that of any member of his family or household or his guests."' '
Similarly, the URLTA does not afford a tenant a remedy against his
landlord where the condition complained of is caused by the "delib-
erate or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of his fam-
ily, or other person on the premises with his consent."5 2 Also like the
MDL,53 the URLTA has provisions making the supply of heat and
water a landlord's duty.5 4
Regrettably absent from the URLTA's list of basic landlord obli-
gations, are security provisions for tenants' protection in the common
area of their buildings. This omission of a need basic to health and
safety certainly cannot be justified in urban, high-crime areas nor
would minimal requirements burden landlords in more rural settings.55
In 1970 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
adopted a more progressive philosophy. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp.,55 following the dictum of Javins v. First
tenant. Id. (c). Assumption of specified maintenance tasks may be agreed to by tenants of
other than a single family dwelling, provided that:
(1) it is a written transfer of duties made in good faith and with adequate con-
sideration;
(2) the duties do not entail corrections of building and housing code violations
affecting health and safety;
(3) the landlord's obligation to other tenants in the building remains the same; and
(4) performance of such duties by the tenant must be independent of the land-
lord's obligations under the lease.
Id. (d), (e).
50 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946); N.Y. MULT. RFs. LAW § 174 (Mc-
Kinney 1952); N.Y. Crry ADMIN. CODE § D26-10.01 (1970).
51 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 78 (McKinney 1946); N.Y. MULT. Ras. LAW § 174 (Mc-
Kinney 1952); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § D26-10.03 (1970) (similar language).
52 URLTA §§ 4.101(a) (3), 4.103(b).
53 N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAw § 75 (McKinney 1946) (water); id. § 79 (McKinney Supp.
1973) (heat). See note 29 supra.
54 URLTA §-2.104(a) (6), note 47 supra.
55 For example, lock and buzzer systems on outer doors, and window locks on lower
floor levels might be required. The New York City Administrative Code requires peep-
holes in the entrance doors of certain dwelling units. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 26-20.01.
That Code further requires mirrors in elevators of multiple dwellings. Id. § D26-20.03.
Also, every class A multiple dwelling unit must be equipped with a latch, dead bolt, and
chain door guard. Id. § D26-20.05 (Supp. 1972).
56 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 71 Misc. 2d 384,
336 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1972) (contract liability not considered, but landlord's
failure to repair a window was found not to be the "cause" of an attack on a tenant).
But see Hall v. Fraknoi, 69 Misc.. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972) (court
questions whether or not protection from third persons is a duty existing within the land-
lord-tenant relationship).
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National Realty Corp.,57 "secure windows and doors" became an essen-
tial feature of the implied warranty of habitability. 8 A related pro-
vision for tenant security also ignored by the URLTA concerns the
lessee's installation of his own lock on the door of his unit. The Act
should provide this right tempered by the added condition that the
landlord be provided a duplicate key for emergency access.5 9
The URLTA prohibits avoidance of the landlord's duty to main-
tain by an assignment of rents.60 Hence, a financing institution which
accepts such an assignment must either assume the risk of the landlord's
failure to maintain or be willing to undertake that duty. Although the
comment to this section6' appears to indicate a continuing and primary
obligation on the landlord's part, the Act should be more specific as to
the nature of the landlord's liability vis-h-vis that of the assignee.
In making receipt of rents conditioned upon maintenance of
premises, the Subcommittee fears an added burden is created which
will discourage construction and increase interest rates.62 This criticism
appears well-founded in light of present housing shortages and man-
dates careful study before legislative enactment.63
Security Deposits
The URLTA's sections treating security deposits64 will unneces-
sarily leave both the landlord and tenant somewhat dissatisfied. While
57 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
58 439 F.2d at 481, citing Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, (D.C. Cir.
1970). Contra, Hall v. Fraknoi, 69 Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972).
59 E.g., N.Y. MuLT. Dwau.. LAW § 51-c (McKinney Supp. 1973). See Lavanant v. Love-
lace, 71 Misc. 2d 974, 337 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1st Dep't 1972). The court in Lavanant, interpret-
ing MDL § 51-c, found the tenant's failure to give the landlord a key to be a breach of
a substantial obligation of the tenancy. Judge Markowitz, dissenting, felt that the land-
lord did not have such an unlimited right, and that in either case, the tenant's behavior
did not warrant eviction. 71 Misc. 2d at 974-78, 337 N.YS.2d at 963-66.
60 A rental agreement, assignment, conveyance, trust deed, or security instru-
ment may not permit the receipt of rent free from the obligation to comply with
Section 2.104(a).
URLTA § 1.404.
61 The obligation of the landlord to maintain fit premises in accordance with
Section 2.104(a) and the rights and remedies of the tenant under Articles II and
IV cannot be defeated or thwarted by the assignment of rents.
URLTA § 1.404 Comment.
62 Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 109.
63 The dual function of this URLTA section is to protect the tenants' rights and
remedies in the event of an assignment of rents and to emphasize further the dependency
of covenants under the Act. The Subcommittee in its report compares the approach to
the provision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (§ 2.404), which invalidates notes
held on non-usable products or on those which there has been a breach of warranty. Id.
However, to make section 1.404 of the URLTA operable without dangerous side effects
a governmental subsidy or underwriting of loans to builders and landlords may be neces-
sary.
64 URLTA §§ 2.101, 2.105.
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limiting the amount of the deposit, and its use to payment of itemized
damages, the Act imposes no obligation that the monies so held be in
trust for tenants or in interest bearing accounts with the interest pay-
able to tenants65 as New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) re-
quires in housing of six or more family dwelling units.66
The Subcommittee's report validly criticizes URLTA section
2.105 which holds a landlord liable for security and pre-paid rent after
his conveyance of the premises to a bona fide purchaser. 67 The Sub-
committee suggests ending liability for such security with its transfer
to the purchaser and notice to the tenant.68 Standard lease forms cur-
rently used in New York provide for an end to such liability with
conveyance of the property and transfer of the security money to the
grantee. 69 Section 7-105 of the GOL offers the best solution by allow-
ing transfer of the security to the purchaser, its return to the lessee,
or its retention by the landlord (the first and third options with notice
to the tenant).70 Furthermore, under New York law, upon transfer of
the security deposit to a grantee, assignee or purchaser at a foreclosure
sale, the landlord's liability for the money ends.71
Delivery of Possession
At common law, a tenant was entitled only to the legal right to
possess leased premises. New York's Real Property Law changed this
by providing that the lessor shall deliver actual possession of the leased
premises at the beginning of the term "in the absence of an express
provision to the contrary."72 However, since enactment of the New
York statute, standard form leases have been supplying just that pro-
vision to the contrary,7 thus, allowing lessors to continue to escape
liability for failure to transfer actual possession to a new lessee. Section
2.103 of the URLTA gives the tenant a non-waivable right to posses-
sion of leased premises at the beginning of the term as per the rental
agreement. The landlord's duties to maintain the premises also corn-
65 Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 109; Thomas, The Uniform Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act, TENANTS OuTLooK, Dec., 1972, at 4, 6.
66 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 7-103(2) a, b (McKinney Supp. 1973).
67 Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 113.
68 Id. The Subcommittee further suggests that the landlord be required to obtain a
receipt for the security deposit from the new owner and forward this, along with an
acknowledgement by the new owner that he assumes the landlord's duties, to the tenant.
Id.
69 See, e.g., Blumberg Dwelling House Lease A-54, art. 20; Blumberg Apartment Lease
A-261, art. 13; Gilsey Form Lease A-185, art. 15.
70 N.Y. GEN. OBLIC. LAw §§ 7-105(1) (A)-(C) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
71 Id. § 7-105 (2).
72 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 223-a (McKinney 1968).
78 E.g., Gilsey Form Lease A-185, art. 27:
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mence at that time.74 In order to protect the landlord from undue
hardship, he is given a right of action against a tenant wrongfully hold-
ing over. This section would negate the "escape clause" of the New
York statute by shifting the burden of suing the wrongful possessor
from the new tenant to the landlord who is, in most cases, in a better
position to do so. The new tenant is also entitled to a rent abatement
until possession is delivered.75 He may elect to terminate the lease
upon five days written notice to the landlord or, in the alternative,
bring an action for possession and actual damages against either the
landlord or the wrongful possessor.76 There is no indication whether
suit against one bars suit against the other. The Act should clearly
state that the landlord's liability does not abate where the holdover is
able to prove rightful possession under a lease or through the exercise
of an option to renew. In any case a wrongful holdover is subject to
suit by both the landlord and the new tenant.77
In a suit for possession under the Act, the plaintiff is allowed a rent
abatement and may recover actual damages.78 Furthermore, his rent will
abate if the premises are delivered, but are in a condition breaching the
landlord's duty to maintain as delineated in section 2.104.70 These ave-
nues of redress for less than complete delivery are inconsistent with
other URLTA remedies in two respects. First, a new tenant about to
take possession who finds that his landlord has not met full main-
tenance requirements is permitted a rent abatement, while a tenant
already in possession and claiming an identical noncompliance must
either terminate and/or sue for actual damages and injunctive relief.8 0
The Arizona adaptation of this section8l eliminates this anomaly to
the landlord's benefit, and does not permit a rent abatement for failure
to deliver possession in a habitable condition. However, since the
tenant is deprived of full consideration, it is suggested that the better
Landlord shall not be liable for failure to give possession of the premises upon
commencement date by reason of the fact that premises are not ready for occu-
pancy or because a prior Tenant or any other person is wrongfully holding over
or is in wrongful possession, or for any other reason. The rent shall not com-
mence until possession is given or available, but the term herein shall not be
extended.
74 URLTA § 2.104.
75 Id. § 4.102(a).
761d. §§ (a) (1), (a) (2).
17 Id. Comment.
78 A lower New York court has held that RPL § 223-a will not support recovery of
money damages. Atlantic Bank v. Sutton Associates, Inc., 36 App. Div. 2d 943, 321, N.Y.S.2d
380 (1st Dep't 1971).
79 URLTA § 4.102(a).
8od. §4.101.
81 ARiz. R v. STAT. § 33-1362(2) (B) (approved May 3, 1973).
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solution is to allow him an abatement whether he be an established or
newly acquiring lessee.
Secondly, the tenant in possession who is faced with a cessation of
essential services may recover the cost of substitute housing.82 The new
tenant however, who is forced to seek temporary substitute housing
due to absence of vital services or possession by a holdover is given
no express right to do so.83 To provide for these costs a further sub-
section to section 4.102(a) might be worded as follows:
(3) In addition to the remedy provided by subdivision (a)(2) of
this section a tenant maintaining an action for possession may
recover the difference between the rent for the premises denied
him and that for comparable substitute housing.8 4
In cases where there can be no delivery of possession because there is
a prior lease to another tenant for the same term, the lessee would
have the normal remedies for breach of a lease agreement.85
Tenant Remedies
The URLTA provides the tenant the remedy of termination when
there is a material noncompliance with the rental agreement or when
the landlord's noncompliance with section 2.104 "materially affect[s]
health and safety," provided the landlord is given notice and fails to
take remedial action within the statutory period.86 In addition, the
tenant is given a cause of action for actual damages and injunctive
relief from any such noncompliance.s7 Also recognized is the right of
82 URLTA §§ 4.104(a) (3), (b). The section allows the tenant to stop paying rent on
the defective housing and in addition recover the "actual and reasonable cost or fair and
reasonable value of the substitute housing not in excess of an amount equal to the periodic
rent ...." Id. (a) (3). This places an overly severe burden on the landlord who is being
doubly penalized. He has to pay the tenant's rent at the new location in addition to not
receiving rent from him.
83 The Subcommittee criticizes the award of indefinite actual damages to a tenant
wrongfully denied possession. Its report finds that, "[a]pplication of contract law principles
would seem to indicate a rightful claim for costs of substitute housing." Subcommittee,
supra note 1, at 111 n.38. The provision for recovery of actual damages (URLTA § 4.102
(2)) is too vague. The lessee who is delayed in taking possession should be explicitly
allowed damages for the substitute housing he is forced to seek.
84 It is suggested that damages rising out of the cost of substitute housing be thus
limited to the lessee's loss of bargain. This approach should also be taken in §§ 4.104(a)
(3), (b). See note 82 supra.
85 URLTA § 1.103 provides that principles of law and equity not displaced by the
Act are still in effect.
86 URLTA § 4.101(a). The Act suggests termination thirty days after the landlord
receives written notice of his breach, if the situation is not corrected in fourteen days. If
substantially the same breach occurs within 6 months, the Act allows termination with
only fourteen days' written notice. Id. §§ 4.101(a), (a)(2).
87 Id. § (b).
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self-help to correct certain defects."" If a landlord wilfully or negli-
gently fails to supply heat, water, electricity, gas or other essential
services ihe tenant may (1) procure substitute services at the land-
lord's expense, (2) recover damages based upon "the diminution in
the fair rental value of the dwelling unit," or (3) procure "reason-
able substitute housing" and recover its cost.89
Although the Act prohibits any covenant in a rental agreement
which would explicitly waive the rights and remedies it provides,9 °
there is no clear prohibition of an implied waiver by payment of rent
after breach by the landlord."1 Furthermore, the Act fails to protect
a tenant from his own good faith error in claiming a breach by the
landlord. 2 The remedies provided should entail less risk to the tenant
than that attending a defense of constructive eviction. Nor should the
landlord be left vulnerable to unsubstantiated allegations.
A possible solution to this apparent clash of interests lies in the
creation of municipal landlord-tenant relations boards with bipartisan
membership.93 The local board's approval would be required before
a tenant employed the remedies of termination, self-help, or procure-
ment of substitute housing facilities. In the case of termination of the
lease, a tenant's action at the instance of such a board would be subject
to judicial review to the same extent applicable to decisions of other
state administrative agencies. As a minimum, guidelines for defining
"material noncompliance" would have to be provided. In all other
tenant actions, application to the board and adherence to its recom-
mendations would establish a tenant's good faith and preclude ter-
881 d. § 4.103.
80 Id. § 4.104(a) (1)(2)(3), (b).
90 Id. §1.403(a) (1).
91 Note that the landlord may waive his right to terminate by accepting rent after he
has knowledge of the tenant's breach. Id. § 4.204.
92 See, e.g., TNTATiVE MODEL CODE, supra note 7, § 3-216. The Model Code allows the
tenant to pay all the rent due as of the date of judgment, to stay proceedings against him.
If the tenant, although wrong, argues in good faith over his liability for rent,
public policy and justice require that he be allowed to correct his unintended
error. This provision is particularly aimed at the tenant's right to repair and
charge expenditures to the landlord when it was the landlord's duty to repair a
defect in the dwelling unit. Since this provision would be vitiated by the pos-
sibility of forfeiture as the result of a good faith error, this redemption is allowed.
Id. Comment.
93 See, e.g., N.YS. 2007 (Jan. 30, 1973). This Bill, introduced by Senator Bernstein, is
now before the Judiciary Committee. It would create state and municipal landlord-tenant
relations boards which would assist in settling disputes, prevent or remedy unfair housing
practices, furnish arbitrators, and investigate controversies. The New York City Housing
Court which opened October 1, 1973, could provide similar services through its hearing
officers. See Note, The New York City Civil Housing Court: Consolidation of Old and
New Remedies, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 483 (1973). [hereinafter cited as Civil Housing Court].
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mination of his lease notwithstanding a subsequent finding that both
tenant and board were in error.
Section 4.103 affords a tenant whose landlord has breached their
rental agreement a limited right of self-help. The Act suggests a maxi-
mum expenditure of the greater of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or
half the rental payment, again provided that sufficient notice of non-
compliance is given and no corrective action is forthcoming.14 A land-
lord-tenant relations board could, therefore, also serve to prevent a
tenant's underestimating the cost of repairs. Until recently, case law
in New York did not favor the tenant who made his own repairs and
sought to offset their cost against his rent.95 Absent a covenant, the
landlord's duty to repair was owed to the municipality rather than
the tenant and, therefore, the lessee could not enforce the obligation
by self-help and setoff.96 However, recent lower court decisions have
allowed tenants their expenditures in correcting housing violations or
alleviating major threats to habitability. 7
Although the tenant is permitted to seek substitute housing,98
when essential services are wilfully or negligently denied, this may be
a futile remedy in light of current housing shortages. However, if he
is able to implement this remedy, the Act should limit the cost to be
recovered for the housing to his loss of bargain.99 The further URLTA
provision allowing an individual tenant to purchase essential services
94 The Subcommittee criticizes section 4.103 because of the possibility of the tenant's
miscalculation of the cost of repairs.
Apparently the limitation is placed not only upon what the tenant can deduct
from the Tent but also upon what he can do on behalf of the landlord. This
would appear to be a reasonable result, for landlords would certainly object to
allowing tenants, assuming the $100 limitation, to perform work costing $500 and
then deducting $100, for the landlord would justifiably prefer to maintain some
control over his property. However, suppose the tenant miscalculates in his
estimate of the cost which a repair may entail. Suppose he estimates $100 and,
after completion, finds it cost him $120. Does he forego his entire remedy or may
he still deduct $100?
Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 116.
95Davar Housing Inc. v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.YS.2d 911 (1st Dep't 1938),
reargument denied, 256 App. Div. 806, 9 N.Y.S.2d 897, aff'd 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E.2d 882 (1939)
(violations of MDL §§ 78, 80); Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank v. 108 W. 49th St. Corp., 255
App. Div. 570, 8 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 791, 21 N.E2d 620 (1939)
(violations of MDL § 78).
96 255 App. Div. at 448, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 914; 255 App. Div. at 574-75, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
97 Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1970). The judge here qualified the reimbursement on the facts of the case involving a
threat to life and health (tenant's children were eating plaster and paint flakes from de-
fective walls). Accord, Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ Ct.
1971) (tenant repaired broken toilet); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d
525, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971) (leaking toilet, pipes, broken window frames,
and roaches).
98 URLTA § 4.104(a) (3).
99 See notes 82 & 84 supra.
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wrongfully denied him and deduct their cost from his rent is often
even less effective than that allowing him to seek substitute housing.' 00
The URLTA is deficient in failing to provide a vehicle by which
tenants may have repairs made or services restored without resorting
to self-help or vacating the premises. A device similar to New York's
"article 7-A" proceeding' 0 ' would be a welcome feature. The New
York statute provides for a petition by the tenants of multiple dwell-
ings0 2 in New York City to have their rents deposited into court for
use in remedying "conditions dangerous to life, health, or safety."103
This special proceeding must be initiated by at least one-third of the
tenants of a dwelling after such a condition has existed for at least five
days. 04 A smilar provision added to the URLTA should also encom-
pass conditions likely to become dangerous to life, health, or safety 15
and provide for future rebate of rent paid during the continuance of
the defect. 0 6
Affirmative Defense
MDL section 302-a 07 provides New York State tenants in cities
with populations of 400,000 or more with a defense for actions for
rent or possession. 08 The tenant relying on this defense must estab-
lish that a "rent impairing violation" exists on official records and
that six months have elapsed since the landlord received departmental
notice of the violation. The tenant must deposit his rent into court.
If he is ultimately successful, he receives a complete rent abatement.
A comparable provision of the URLTA10 9 allows a tenant to de-
100 Id. (a)(1). For example, in a multiple dwelling unit the only sources of gas, water,
and heat are in most cases exclusively under the landlord's control.
101 N.Y. R-AL PROP. AciONS & PRoc. LAw §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1973); see
TENTATV MODEL CoDE, supra note 5, § 3-201 (similar to "article 7-A" proceeding with
receivership provisions); Civil Housing Court, supra note 93, at 502-03.
102 N.Y. REAL PROP. AcnONS & PRoc. LAw § 782 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (applicable
to dwellings of six or more apartments).
103 Id. § 769.
104 Id. § 770.
105Id. § 755(1) (a). Section 755 is a defense available to New York City tenants in a
proceeding or action for rent. On proof that a municipal department has given the land-
lord notice of a violation which amounts to a constructive eviction of the tenant, or which
"is, or is likely to become, dangerous to life, health, or safety,..." a stay will be granted.
Id. (1) (a).
106 In considering commencement of an "article 7-A" proceeding the tenant is on the
horns of a dilemma. He has to pay full rent into court while living under unsound con-
ditions. Modifying the statute to allow an abatement would only lessen the amount avail-
able for the court to draw upon for the remedying of defects. The answer may lie in
adapting the statute so as to award the tenants a rebate in the amount of their damages.
107 See City Housing Court, supra note 93, at 502-05.
108 Note the New York City tenant's added defense, supra note 105.
109 URLTA § 4.105.
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fend an action for rent or possession based on non-payment of rent
with the allegation of the landlord's noncompliance with either the
rental agreement or the Act. The court "may" order the tenant to
pay the rent into court and divide it between the parties according to
their merit. The tenant may also use this section to counterclaim
against the landlord in such actions. 110 The section is more liberal than
MDL section 302-a in that it does not require a six month term of what
amounts to living in uninhabitable premises. Additionally, the URLTA
counterclaim may be brought for a broader range of violations,"' but
the successful tenant will not necessarily receive a total rent abate-
ment as he would under New York's MDL. The tenant with a worthy
defense or counterclaim under the URLTA is required to pay for the
partial consideration he has received, but no more. The New York
requirement that rent be paid into court while the violations subsist
has been criticized. 1 2 However, since the lessee under the URLTA
is not supported by an official record of a violation in establishing his
defense or counterclaim, requiring him to pay the accrued rent into
court serves to minimize the number of capricious claims. The URLTA
procedure is more flexible and would result in more expeditious res-
olution of tenant grievances.
Retaliatory Eviction
In order to prevent a landlord's thwarting tenant complaints or
their organization into unions, the URLTA provides sanctions for
retaliatory conduct. 13 A tenant's allegation that his landlord's action
for possession is being brought in retaliation has been judicially rec-
ognizea as a valid defense.114 Following the lead of the Court of Ap-
110 Section 4.105 is consistent with modern procedure reform in permitting the
tenant to file a counterclaim or other appropriate pleading in the summary pro-
ceeding to the end that all issues between the parties may be disposed of in one
proceeding. It is anticipated that upon filing of the counterclaim the court will
enter the order deemed appropriate by him concerning the payment of rent in
order to protect the interests of the parties.
Id. Comment.
III A "rent impairing" violation under MDL § 302-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973), is
one which "in the opinion of the department, constitutes, or if not promptly corrected,
will constitute, a fire hazard or serious threat to life, health or safety of the occupants .... "
112 Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 23-24, 318 N.Y.S.2d I1, 21 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1971). The Amanuensis court found that the section 302-a deposit is required of the
tenant
(1) without proof that the amount demanded is accurate, (2) without a time limit
on the landlord's right to bring his action, and (3) without necessity, since the
validity of the defense may be established by the official records showing the rent
impairing violation.
113 URLTA § 5.101.
114 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
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peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Edwards v. Habib,"15
lower courts in New York State have allowed this defense. Typically,
the landlord's action will be considered retaliatory when it is in re-
sponse to a tenant's participation in a rent strike,116 a tenant's out-
spoken membership in a tenant's association, 117 or when, as in Ed-
wards, it results from tenant complaints of housing code violations."18
New York statutes prohibit retaliatory conduct by a landlord when
the tenant asserts his rights under rent control legislation.'" Anti-
retaliation provisions of the URLTA may be found to be too narrow
as presently structured. The National Tenants Organization (NTO) ad-
vocates a stay of eviction in any case where a tenant could, in "good
faith," raise the defense of retaliation. 20 URLTA section 5.101 allows
the presumption that the landlord is acting vindictively if the alleged
retaliatory action is within one year (suggested period) of the following:
(1) a tenant complaint to an official agency concerning materially
unhealthful and hazardous building and housing code vio-
lations;
(2) a tenant complaint to the landlord concerning the landlord's
duty to maintain; or
(3) the tenant's participation in or organization of a tenant's
union.
Additionally, URLTA section 5.101(b) disallows the presumption of
retaliation if the tenant's complaint comes after notice of a rent in-
crease or diminution in services. The NTO notes that this may dis-
courage a tenant from bringing a complaint about a building's con-
dition at a time when he feels most justified in doing so.121 The NTO's
criticism has substance in that if the complaint is a valid one, it should
115 397 F.2d at 699.
116 Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968).
117 Church v. Allen Meadows Apartments, 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup Ct.
Onondaga Coubty 1972).
118 Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 338 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County CL 1972).
119 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 8590(2) (McKinney 1961); id. 8609(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
120 Thomas, The Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, TENANTS OuTLooK, Dec.,
1972, at 4.
121 Id. Senator Bernstein's bill to establish a landlord-tenant relations act, treats the
problem of reprisals by landlords. N.Y.S. 2007 § 465 (Jan. 30, 1973). The bill provides for
a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory conduct when a landlord brings an action to evict
or makes a "substantial alteration in the terms of such tenancy" within 180 days of a
tenant's complaint or involvement with a tenant organization. Id. at (8). This section is
more realistic than the corresponding section of the URLTA in the time period allowed
for the presumption. It also expressly provides that the defense is not limited to the time
period. Id.
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give rise to the presumption irrespective of the circumstances under
which it was brought.
Fire or Casualty Damage
The URLTA gives a tenant an option to terminate his lease
agreement if fire or casualty damage "substantially" impairs "enjoy-
ment of the dwelling unit."'122 However, no definition of the term "sub-
stantially impaired" is given. The Act also affords no protection to
landlords who find it economically infeasible to repair, yet are faced
with tenants who wish to remain in possession.
Present law in New York 123 allows a tenant to surrender premises
which have become uninhabitable due to casualty damage unless there
is a lease agreement to the contrary. Standard form leases often include
a covenant allowing the lease to continue despite an untenantable
condition if the landlord decides to rebuild.124 A viable compromise
between the URLTA and the situation in New York might be modeled
after the fire clause of the Form Office Lease approved by the Real
Property Committee of the New York City Bar Association. 125 The
landlord would have the option to terminate the lease agreement if
the damage sustained equalled or exceeded 30 per cent of the building's
pre-casualty replacement value. The tenant could give the landlord
notice of his election to terminate if the damage to the building
amounted to 50 per cent or more of that value. The landlord would
have a duty to restore the building if the damage came to less than 30
per cent of the replacement value, with the tenant to receive an appor-
tioned rent abatement in any case. 126
The Landlord's Outlook
The landlord, having been the favored party in the common law
lease, would apparently receive few new benefits from the URLTA.
While certain obligations are imposed upon the tenant, these are
limited mainly to keeping the premises as clean and safe as conditions
will permit, not deliberately or negligently damaging them, and re-
122 URLTA § 4.106.
123 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227 (McKinney 1968).
124 Blumberg Dwelling House Lease A-54, art 5 (rent ceases until repair is made);
Blumberg Form Apartment Lease Approved by Committee on Real Property, Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, art. 7 (an apportionment of rent until damage is
repaired); Office Lease, Real Estate Board of New York, art. 9 (express waiver of RPL §
227).
125 Form of Office Lease Approved by the Real Property Committee of The Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York A254, art. 8.




fraining from disturbing neighbors.' 2T The provision restricting the
lessee to reasonable use of facilities and appliances 28 would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to enforce except in very extreme situations.
The landlord's remedies for a tenant's material noncompliance with
the rental agreement or the Act "materially affecting health and safety,"
and his failure to pay rent'2 9 are not novel. Previously, the landlord
would merely indicate in the lease itself those breaches which would
be deemed to be material.
Further sections "grant" the landlord the right to make reason-
able rules and regulations concerning use and occupancy' 30 and the
right of reasonable access to the premises.13 In general, those provi-
sions favorable to the landlord merely lend an element of balance
to the Act in an attempt to make it more palatable to all parties. The
primary thrust of the URLTA remains in providing the tenant a
right to demand full consideration for rent paid.
CONCLUSION
Undergoing a steady reformation in case law, the landlord-tenant
relationship is yet in need of modernization with a definitive statutory
restatement. Generally, the URLTA attempts to meet this need. It is
unlikely however, that the New York State Legislature will hasten to
promote its adoption. The MDL and MRL already provide the tenant
with guarantees of essential services and facilities. MDL section 302-a
allows a wronged New York State tenant a defense to a suit for non-
payment of rent while New York City tenants have the additional
RPAPL section 755 defense 32 and an affirmative action in the "article
7-A" proceeding to which there is nothing comparable in the URLTA.
Furthermore, the Act's sections 2.101 and 2.105 treating security de-
127 URLTA §§ 3.101(1)-(4), (6), (7).
128 Id. (5).
129 Id. §§ 4.201, 4.202.
130 Id. § 3.102. Such right is specifically reserved in Office Form Lease A-254, Approved
by the Real Property Committee of the Bar of the City of New York, art. 5 and the Office
Lease, Real Estate Board of New York, art 35. The URLTA requires that the tenant have
notice of the rules when he takes possession. If they are adopted after he enters, they must
not be a substantial modification of his lease and he must be given notice of their enact-
ment. URLTA § 3.102. The Act also provides that such rules be equitably applied. Id.
(a)(3).
131 d. § 3.103. Lease form usually reserve the landlord's right of access to show, in-
spect, and repair the premises. See. e.g., Blumberg Dwelling House Lease Form A-54, art.
17; Blumberg Apartment Lease Form 48, Approved by the Committee on Real Property,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, art. 18.
Under New York State rent control legislation, and the New York City Administrative
Code, the tenant's unreasonable refusal of access is a ground for eviction. N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAws § 8585(1) (f) (McKinney 1961); N.Y. CmTy ADIMIN. CODE § D26-10.07 (1970).
132 See note 105 supra.
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posits are actually inferior to GOL sections 7-103 and 7-105. These
factors make the Act's reforms less urgent in New York than elsewhere.
Administration of the URLTA could be greatly assisted if it
established a landlord-tenant relations board. This board would ar-
bitrate disputes and prevent their eruption by advising landlords and
tenants of their respective rights and obligations. It might also serveN
a policing function by funneling building and housing code complaints
to the appropriate departments.
The URLTA, although in need of refining,13 3 does bolster the
tenant's position by making his rights inalienable, by outlawing un-
conscionable clauses, and by requiring that an aggrieved party mitigate
his damages. The principle of caveat emptor is rejected and the pay-
ment of rent does not merely entitle the lessee to "quiet enjoyment,"
but is made dependent upon the habitable condition of his premises.
The Act should be studied by state legislatures with a view toward
their state's particular landlord-tenant problems. It will no doubt raise
strong landlord opposition 34 and be pejoratively denominated a com-
promise by tenant groups.'2 5 However, its propelling concepts make it
worthy of serious consideration. It finally gives the lessee basic rights,
which for lack of a bargaining position were long denied.
Irene Castaldo
POSTSClRIPT
At the February, 1974 meeting of the ABA a revised URLTA
was approved with the further understanding that alternative sections
to the Act would be forthcoming. The revisions which precipitated
ABA approval were in the nature of clarifications. For example, "rent"
is redefined in section 1.301(10) to include payments made for the
benefit of as well as to the landlord; the comment to section 2.101 on
security deposits now notes that this section is not intended to limit
prepaid rent.
Tenants' remedies of section 4.101 for landlord noncompliance
are expressly not limited to those provided therein. Tenants are re-
minded, however, that the duty to mitigate damages delineated in sec-
133 See note I supra.
134 TENANT'S OUTLOOK, July, 1973, at 1, 7.
135Id. at 1. See generally Moskovitz, The Model Landlord Tenant Code, 3 UR"AN
LAwYER 597 (1971). Several of these criticisms of the Model Code would apply to the
URLTA. For example, neither the Code nor the present Act address the need for more
housing or provide for the creation of tenant's organizations. Id. at 598.
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tion 1.105(a) applies to them as well as their landlord. The revised
comment to section 4.102 states that injunctive relief may also be avail-
able in cases of a landlord's failure to deliver possession. Furthermore,
section 4.104(a)(1) has been modified to allow tenants deprived of essen-
tial services to secure them only by "reasonable and appropriate mea-
sures." The comment to this section will include the notation that
tenants may act collectively to secure such services but in all events must
act with the good faith required by section 1.302.
